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~T.\T~1fEXrr OF THE KIND OF CASE 
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{on acted by ~a 1 t Lake City Corporation. 
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~ummary judgment of dismissal at the pretrial con-
ference. 
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RELIEF SO·UGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs, Willia1n Cossey and Blae E. Hansen, seek 
reversal of the summary judgment of dis1nissal and a 
trial on the merits of the action. 
STATEI\IENT OF FACTS 
On the 1st day of October, 1963, the Board of Coin-
missioners of Salt Lake City passed an ordinance chang-
ing the zoning classification of approxin1ately one-half of 
a city block from a Residential R-6 classification to a 
Business B-3 classification. This suit \Vas instituted on 
October 30, 1963, for judgment declaring the ordinance 
invalid and in excess of the City's po"~er and authority 
and for decree enjoining and restraining the defendants 
from granting building permits for the erection of im-
provements not authorized in a Residential R-6 zone. 
Plaintiffs are taxpayers and property owners in the 
area affected by the zoning ordinance. The con1plaint 
alleges that on or about September 1, 1927, the defendant 
City enacted a zoning ordinance and adopted a use dis-
trict map in pursuance of a comprehensive plan for 
zoning of Salt Lake City and that the Board of ·Com-
Inissioners of the defendant City has appointed a quali-
fied Planning Commission to process, study and advise 
'\\:rith respect to all 1natters relating to the comprehensive 
plan. It further avers, inter alia, that on or about May 
28, 1963, Alder-Wallace, Inc. filed \vith the Planning 
C~ommission its petition for a1nendment of the use dis-
trict 1nap by changing certain premises located in a 
Residential R-6 use district to a Commercial C'-3 classifi-
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cation: that in accordan<·P \v"ith the provisions of the 
~tatuh· the Planning (~ommission made a careful study 
ot' tht· pPtition and the ehangc therehy proposed "Tith 
respr<·t to the cotnprehensive plan; that the Planning 
Cntnn1ission after said study reconunended that the 
applieation he denied for the reasons that: (R. 3-4) 
..... th(• said pro poRed ehange "~as not consistent 
"·ith, but contrary to the con1prehensive zoning 
plan: that the proposed change bore no reason-
able relationship to the character of the area and 
di~trirt to be affected thereby: that there was no 
need or reason ~ho"'"n for additional business or 
eotntnercial zoning; that the proposed change 
""ould constitute 'spot' zoning and that the appli-
cation ",.as for other sound reasons inconsistent 
\rith the general purpose and plan of the then 
Pxisting zoning ordinance." 
Plaintiffs' complaint next alleges the adoption of the 
ordinance changing the subject pre1nises from an R-6 
classification to a B-3 classification and avers that the 
ordinance is invalid for the following reasons: (R 4-5) 
HTX. The ordinance attempting to rezone the 
said tract of land, thereby creating a small Busi-
nes~ B-3 district in a Residential R-6 district, and 
all thing~ done or attempted in pursuance there-
of are unla'\\'"ful and in excess of the City's power 
and authority and null and void and in violation 
of the express terms of Title 10, c·hapter 9, Utah 
Code .A.nnotated 1953, in the following particu-
lars: 
(a) Said attempted zoning of said tract 
of land in the residential district of Salt 
Lake City is not in accordance, but contrary 
to thP eomprehensive zoning plan authorized 
by statute and adopted by the City. 
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4 
(b) Said atte1npted rPzoning of ~aid 
tract of land does not tend to prou1otP Pither 
the health, safety or general \\'Plfare of Salt 
Lake City, nor does the same tend to lessen 
congestion in the streets or to secure saf(~ty 
from fire, panic or other dangers, or to pro-
mote any of the othPr purposes for which 
zoning of cities is by statute permitted, but 
on the contrary, such atten1pted zoning tends 
to the detriment of the purposes for \vhieh 
zoning is permitted. 
(c) Said attempted rezoning does not 
give reasonable _or any consideration to thP 
character of the district or the use of lands 
therein, nor does it encourage or tend to en-
courage the 1nost appropriate use of lands 
throughout the City as specified and required 
by the statutes, but on the contrary, said 
attempted rezoning tends to and does pro-
miscuously intermingle business property 
with residential property, contrary to and 
in disregard of the letter, purpose and spirit 
of the statutes and the zoning plan authorized 
and adopted for Salt Lake ·City. 
{d) No notice of a proposed change of 
the use district map from Residential R-6 
classification to Business B-3 classification 
as required by Title 10, Chapter 9, Section 
5, U.C.A. 1953, 'vas given prior to the enact-
ment of the ordinance." 
The defendants filed answers ad1nitting 1nost of the 
material allegations of the co1nplaint but denying the 
allegations of the aforesaid Paragraph IX and praying 
for dismissal of the con1plaint (R. 10, 11, 12, 13). Coun-
sel for Alder-Wallace, Inc. thereafter filed his affidavit 
'vherein he recites the enactnu~nt of the ordinanee and 
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~tatP~ that "the quPHtion involved in the instant litiga-
tion i~ \rho1ly a tnatter of la\\·'' (R. 17-.19). Counsel'~ 
affidavit also identifies the use distriet 1nap of Salt 
Lake City, \rhich is attached thereto as an exhibit. De-
fpnsP <·onnsel also filed the affidavit of 'r ern on J orgen-
~Pn, \rhich rPcites that ~ir. Jorgensen has advised the 
1nayor of Salt .I .jake City with respect to \Yhat notice has 
<·nstotnarily been required preceding the enactment of 
zoning ordinance~ (R. 21). With the issues thus framed, 
and based upon the pleadings and the aforesaid affi-
davit~, thP defendants moved the Court for summary 
judg1nent of dismissal ( R. 15). 
On Fehruary 5, 1964, defendants' motion for sum-
•nary judgment came on regularly for hearing before 
the l-lonorable Aldon J. Anderson. The motion was 
argued h~· counsel and at the conclusion of the hearing 
the ~an1e \vas denied. Judge Anderson made and entered 
his \Vritten order denying said motion (R. 23). 
On the sa1ne day that the motion for summary judg-
Inent 'vas denied, defense counsel filed a notice of readi-
ness for trial. Within one day after the service of the 
notice of readiness, plaintiffs' counsel filed a \vritten 
objection to thP same (R. 25). Notwithstanding said 
objection the cas0 \vas given a preferential pretrial 
setting by the Honorable A. H. Ellett. 
On March 11, 1964, the case came on for pretrial 
before Judge Ellett. After a preliminary discussion the 
Court directed plaintiffs' counsel to enlarge upon the 
allegations of the complaint by stating further the 
grolmds upon "·hich it 'vas contended that the City had 
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acted arbitrarily. Plaintiffs' counseln1ade the follo\ring 
statement: (R. 28-34) 
H l\IR .. :JIACFARLANE: 1 \rill state that 
specifically the action that \Vas taken herP that 
the plaintiffs dee1n to be arbitrary is alleged in 
the con1plaint and particularly paragraph 9 of 
the co1nplaint; and we rely, of course, no\v upon 
every one of the allegations of the complaint and 
will state more specifically-
THE c·o,URT: Yes. 
1IR. MACFARLANE: -at this time in 
support of the allegations of the cornplaint but 
not by way of limitation that the commission was 
arbitrary and capricious and acted without re-
gard to a general or co1nprehensive plan in that 
in the i1nmediate vicinity, that is, bet\veen South 
Temple and Ninth East Street and Second East 
-I mean South Temple and Ninth South Street 
and Second East and Seventh East there are 41¥2 
acres of Business B-3 zoning, 27 per cent of which 
is not being used for business purposes; 55¥2 
acres of Commercial C-1 zoning, 39 per cent of 
which or -!0 per cent of \vhich is not used for busi-
ness purposes; 243.3 acres of Commercial C-3 
zoning, 25 per cent or 32¥2 per cent of which is 
not used for business purposes, indicating that 
there is considerable land in the general area 
already zoned for business or commercial use 
\\"hich is not so used; and that the evidence would 
further sho\v- that there are substandard and de-
teriorated business and connnercial buildings in 
the B-3, (~-1, and C-3 areas \vhich should be re-
placed by new buildings; that the action of the 
commission in jumping a block of property zoned 
R-6 and R-7 and establishing a C-3 zone entirely 
or B-3 zone entirely surrounded by commercial-
! mean residential property \Vas completrly \\"ith-
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out regard to any general or eotnprehensive plan 
and, on thP contrary, has the nPeessary effect of 
estnhlishing instability in the adjoining residen-
tial properties~ that the boundaries established 
for the new zone are not only unrelated to any 
cotnprehPnsive or general plan but are not logical 
boundaries and are based entirely upon the appli-
ration of Alder-"'r allace, '"hich in turn is based 
upon the availability of land and not its suitabili-
ty for USP within the meaning of the zoning laws; 
that criteria which have been followed and are 
~ti 11 a part of the general plan of the city were 
ignored in creating the new district in that it is 
not contiguous to any existing commercial area 
and nonetheless is ",.ithin close proximity to other 
cotnmercial areas, is established on Seventh East, 
'vhieh is a main artery of traffic for "'"hich the 
poliry of the commission, both planning commis-
sion and city com1nission, has been and still is to 
prevent access, new access and particularly busi-
nPss access on said freeway, and the further 
criteria that there shall be no zone change made 
except upon the sho'\\ring of need or change of 
c.ondi tions in the area; that as a matter of law 
the sho'\\'"ing, attempted sho,Ying made on behalf 
of the application, did not show either a change 
of conditions or need which would warrant the 
action that was taken, there being no economic 
studies or any other evidence produced before the 
co1nmission: that the uses allo,ved in the B-3 dis-
trict are incoinpatible '""ith the future develop-
Inent of the lands surrounding the spot 'vhich \Vas 
zoned here, w·hich lands are zoned R-6. 
Xo,v, in substance, Your Honor, that is our 
position 'vith reference to the action that was 
taken by the commission. 
THE COlTRT : Let me ask you one other 
thing. ''Till your proof show \Yhether or not any 
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of those acreages of land zoned to B-3 "~as avail-
able for sale and not alrPady used by so1ne other 
use that couldn't be readily changed~ 
n[R. ~I ACF ARLAKE : )'" PS, \\~P think it 
will. N o,v, I personally did not participate jn the 
study, and I don't kno~r "Thich of th< 1SP lands 
\Vould be availablP and at what pricPs. 
THE C0{1RT: Well, I in1agine your Utah 
Power & Light in a "~hole block, 'vould be ten 
acres of that, and I am sure nothing 'vould change 
that. 
niR. :JIA·CF ARLANJ~: That is probably 
true. 
THE CO·UR.T : I "~onder if it is true in the 
rest of this acreage. 
MR. MACFARLANE : I don't think so. 
THE COUR.T: What is the use that he pro-
poses to put this to~ 
MR. ~IcCONKIE: The proble1n is they 
have to get a big area in one place. 
THE COUR,T : N o,v, you have on Second 
South two shopping areas east of Fifth East or 
Fourth, one between Fourth and Fifth and one 
b e t 'v e e n Second and Third; Albertson's and 
Grand Central are on Second South further 'Yrst 
half between there and to"rn, don't you~ 
~IR. l\IAC·F ARLANE : I don't know. 
MR. lfcCONKIE : Yes. 
~lR. CR.ELLIN: Is it Albertson? 
l\fR.. 1\{cCONI{IE : Albertson on S e c o n d 
South and Fourth East and Grand Central on 
Second South and Fifth East. 
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'r II F~ ro l TRT : AtH 1 do you have any-ho'v 
far north do yon haYP to go fro1n ~peond South 
hpfor·p you rornP to ~neb a ~imilar shopping cen-
t(lr ~ 
~I R. ~leC()Xl(IE: J n~t a 1no1nent, Your 
II on or. 
'ri-ll~ ( 10URT: Let l\fr. Macfarlane-he is 
tPlling nlP \vhat hi~ proof \\·ill sho,v. I 'vonder 
\\·hat his proof 'vill sho'v about that. 
~IR. ~Lt\.CF ARLANE: l\Iy proof "·ill sho"· 
that there is propert),. zoned for commercial and 
husinP~~ use \\rithin thP area as shown b~,. the USP 
di~triet 1nap \\rhich is a part of the file here. 
THE C()lTRT: Let's mark it. 
~IR .. ~I ... I\CFARLANE: \Vhether it is ac-
tuall~· used for that I don't know, but I'm not-
~IR. l\Icc·oNKIE: This is 1ny copy. We 
haYP one in the file if you want to mark the one 
in the file. 
JIR. CREILLIN: J.\!Iight as well use this, 
Judge. They are exactly the same. 
THE COlTRT : I will use this one. 
~rR. CRELLIN: Except you haYe to pull 
it out of the file. 
THE COl'"RT: That's all right. Can it be 
agreed that pretrial Exhibit 1, \vhich I am now 
marking, is a-and, by the \\ray, that is a photo-
static copy attached to an affidavit signed by 
,.,. ern on Jorgensen. l\[ay it be agreed that that is 
a photo~tatic copy of a use 1nap of Salt Lake 
City! 
~IR. ~I ... -\. CF AR.L ... \XE : Yes. 
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MR. CRELLIN: Yes. 
THE COlTRT : Do you gentle1nen so agrPe? 
::\IR. CR.ELLIN: rrhat's right. 
MR. ~IcCONKIE: Yes. 
THE c·OlTRT : Can it further hP agrePd 
that the general plan of Salt Lake City is to be 
ascertained from this use map together with the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City now in 
force and effect, 1955 ~ 
~fR. MA·CF ARLANE : No. 
~fR. CRELLIN: That is our position. 
MR. l\fcCONKIE: Yes, but if that is the 
case, you are bound to give-
THE c·o·URT : Wait a minute What then, 
~Ir. ~facfarlane, do you claim the-where will I 
look for the general plan if I don't look to the 
ordinances~ 
MR. MACFARLANE : I think you may 
only look for the general plan in the tflstimony of 
planning com1nission members and eity commis-
sion members, not only in the past for " .. hat the 
plan has been, but in the present for 'vhat, of 
course, they may-,vhat the present plan is. 
THE COURT : As for-
MR. M.ACF ARLANE : ~ly position is that 
the use district map is simply evidence or the 
effect, presumably the effect, of some plan which 
concededly 1nay be amended from time to time; 
but 'vhenever any ordinance is enacted amending 
or ehanging the use district map, it must be in 
accordance with some general over-all or compre-
hensive plan or purpose affecting an area beyond 
that imn1ediately affected hy the application. 
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rrHE (~()l~Rrr: \Y'ouldn't you agrer that thP 
ordinaneP~ of Salt Lake Citv would be some rvi-
dPnre of what the plan "~~s, "·hat the general 
plnn iH Y 
:\I R. ~L:\C'F ARLANE: ,, ... ell, e e r t a in 1 y 
thafs solllP PvidPnce of 'vhat the eity has done in 
1 ntrsnaneP of the plan, that is correct. 
rrilE CO·lTRT: All right: but then you also 
<·lnirn that the general plan lies \\"ithin the me1nory 
und kno\\·ledge of certain people, is not \YTitten 
down any,vhere7 
~fR. ~IACF,ARLANE: "\Veil, that is cor-
reet. I don't think that you can look at the use 
district n1ap and say, 'Here is the plan. Now, 
"·herP do \\~P go from here~' I think that there 
has to be so1nething independent of the use dis-
trirt tnap and the ordinance in order to guide the 
connnission in its actions in amending the plan, 
and thP statute itself says that there must be a 
general or co1nprehensive plan, and I deem that 
to he something in addition to the ordinance and 
the use district map. 
~IR. CREIJLIN: Then every ordinance that 
Salt Lake City has ever passed 'vould be in jeo-
pardy under that theory, Your Honor, because 
Pvery ordinance that's ever been passed since the 
antiquity could be challenged on the basis that we 
then go to the memory of people at that time as to 
\Yhat the basis of plan was." 
During the course of the pretrial plaintiffs moved 
thP court to a1nend the complaint by adding to Para-
graph IX an additional allegation "that the ordinance is 
invalid and of no force and effect for the reason that 
the applicant, Alder-''r allace, Inc., as a mere optionee 
having no legal or equitable interest in the real estate 
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did not have standing to invoke the zoning po,,·pr of thr 
city" (R-. 34). Though defense counsel1nade no objection 
to the timeliness of this Inotion, the 1notion \vas deniPd 
by Judge Ellett upon the ground that as a InattPr of la\v 
an optionee does have sufficient standing to invoke thP 
zoning ordinance (R. 38). 
·The court thereupon directed the dis1nissal of plain-
tiffs' complaint with prejudice and subsequently entered 
judgment of dismissal (R. 27, 38). This appeal follo\\·Pd. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW FROM THE PLEADINGS AND PRE-
TRIAL STATEMENT THAT THE CITY HAD ACTED WITH-
IN ITS AUTHORITY IN ADOPTING THE ZONING ORDI-
NANCE. 
If, under the pleadings and pretrial statement, there 
is any material issue of fact, or any material issue of 
la\v which cannot properly be resolved 'vithout factual 
background not before the Court, then the dis1nissal 
must be set aside and the cause remanded for trial. The 
substance of the allegations attacking the zoning action 
are that: (R. 5-6, 28-30) 
1. The zoning action is 1zot in accordance 
·zcith a co1nprehe'11sive plan. Change of the use 
classification fro1n residential to business is not 
based upon any general or co1nprehensive plan 
related to benefit of the district, area or com-
Jnunitv as a 'vhole but instead is based solely 
upon ~onsiderations pertinent to the property re-
zoned and the o'vners of such property. 
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:2. The zonin.f/ action is not in furtherance of 
thP potict· JUHl'l'r. The ordinance is not designed 
to and cloPs not areo1nplish any of the objectives 
of the polic'P po\ver ( i.P. health, safety~ general 
\\'PlfarP. ~treet congestion, security from fire, 
pnnie, ete.). 
:1. The zoning action is contrary to the stated 
JHtrpo.'·W of the zoning lau·."·· The ordinance gives 
no consideration to other properties in the resi-
dential di~trict "'hPre the change has been made 
nnd doPs not encourage appropriate use and 
orderl~· developn1ent of land in the district, area 
or eonununity~ bnt on the contrary arbitrarily 
intPrininglPs husinPss property 'vith residential 
JlrOpPrt~· to the detriment of other property 
o'vners and the community as a whole. 
-1-. The atnendn1ent of the existing zoning 
nlaJJ is not supported by a shouJing of changed 
couditio11s. The zoning act changes or an1ends 
thP existing plan (presumably fair, rational and 
ron1prehensive) in the absence of any sho,ving of 
change of conditions or change of circumstances 
\Yhich 'vould warrant interruption of the stability 
of said pIan. 
In reyie,ving a su1nn1ary judg1nent of disn1issal an 
t'~tahlished principle of appellate review is that the re-
view·ing court 'vill accept as true the allegations of the 
plaintiffs' complaint and pretrial statement even though 
the ~arne are in n1aterial respects denied by the defend-
ants. 1:-nless there is a stipulation or admission or son1e 
uncontroverted evidence 'vhich would justify the trial 
judge in concluding as a n1atter of la'v that the allega-
tions attacking the ordinance are not true, then said 
allegations n1ust be accepted as fact for the purpose of 
thi~ appeal. In determining the merit of appellants' 
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argument this Court 1nust resolve the follo\\?ing quP~­
tions: 
A. Are the allegations attacking the ordinance 
sufficient in la\v to state a claim of invalidity 
and, if so, ' 
B. Doe~ the record belo\v justify a judicial de-
terJuination as a matter of law that the alle-
gations attacking the ordinance are not true f 
Proper resolution of these issues requires a revie'v of 
the law applicable to the case at bar. 
Salt Lake City is e1npo,vered by statute to '~regulate 
and restrict ... the location and use of buildings, struc-
tures and land for trade, industry, residence or other 
purposes" and for that purpose to "'divide the munici-
pality into districts of such number, shape and area as 
may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of 
[the statute]" (10-9-1, 2, U.·C.A., 1953). The power of 
the City to enact zoning ordinances in accordance with 
the intent and purpose of the statute and within the limi-
tations of the statute is not questioned in this case. 
The City, however, does not have the unlilnited, un-
defined and unrestricted power to legislate the use of 
property. Statutory limitations are specifically imposed 
by Section 10-9-3, U.C.A., 1953: 
"10-9-3. Reg,ulations to be in accordance with 
coJnprehensi~·e plan.-81f.Ch regulat-i.ons shall be 
1nade in accorda,nce with a co1nprehensive plan 
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to 
secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, 
to promote health and the general \\'"elfare, to pro-
vide adequate light and air, to prevent the over-
rro\vding of land, to avoid undue concentration 
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of population, to facilitate adequatP provision for 
tran:-;portation. \\·ater, se\\·age, schools, parks and 
othPr public requirements. Such regulations shall 
bt, nuule 1rit h reasonable consideration, among 
olht'r thin,qs, to the character of the district and 
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and 
with a. ni('U' to conserving the value of btttildings 
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land 
throu.,rJhout the city." (Emphasis added) 
ThP dPeision of this (~ourt in Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 
105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, fixes son1e guidelines and 
~tnndards hy \Yhieh the validity of municipal zoning 
nrtion is to be determined. 
Plaintiff in the Marshall case attacked an ordinance 
tunending the zoning map on the ground that Salt Lake 
City did not have the authority as a part of a general 
zoning plan to create small general utility zones 'vithin 
rP~idPntial districts. The case was tried to the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. Upon trial of the cause, 
including extensive evidence pertaining to the character 
of the areas involved, land uses, existing zoning and 
background of the zoning ordinance as it affected the 
area in question, the trial court concluded that the 
a1nendment to the map was unreasonable, unlawful, dis-
criininatory and void. On appeal the decision of the trial 
court 'vas reversed upon specific determination from the 
eridencc in the cause that the amendment of the map 'vas 
in accordance ""ith a general zoning plan to set within 
reasonable ""alking distance of homes in the residential 
areas, daily fa1nily conveniences such as groceries, gaso-
line, etc. In this regard, the Supreme Court concluded 
fro1n the evidence that there was "a definite and com-
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prehensive plan" and that the zoning action hen' \Vas a 
part of such plan and was therefore valid. ThP purpose 
and limitations of the zoning authority \Vere PxprPssed 
as follows: (105 Utah 111, 119-125) 
~'. . . As ~ho,vn hy· th<:l above quotes fron1 thP 
statute, the city i~ authorized to regulate and 
rPstrict ~the location and use of buildings, struc-
tures and land for trade, industry, residence and 
other purposes' and to accomplish this 'may di-
vide the municipality into Districts of such num-
ber, shape and area as n1ay be deemed best suited 
to carry out the purposes of this Article.' (Italics 
ours) This is done under the police power and 
by the statute must be done in accordance \Vith a 
co1nprehensive plan, designed, inter alia, to lessen 
congestion in the street, promote the general \vel-
fare, facilitate transportation, and other public 
requirements. It shall be done with reasonable 
consideration of the character of the district, 
its suitability for particular uses 'and with a 
view to conserving * * * and encouraging the 
most appropriate use of land.' Sec. 15-8-91, supra. 
That the statute contemplates a division and 
regulation by districts, instead of regulation by 
single lots or small groups of lots, is evident. 
The regulation of the use of property by lots or 
by very small areas is not zoning and does vio-
lence to the purpose and provisions of the statute. 
It would not, and could not, accomplish the pur-
pose of the la\v as set forth in th~ statute quoted 
supra .... 
* * * 
'~City zoning is authorized only as an exer-
ei se of the police po,ver of the state. It must 
therefore have for its purposes and objectives 
1natters \Vhich come \Yithin the province of the 
police po"Ter. \Y.hen exercised by a rity. it is of 
necessity confined by the limitations fixerl in the 
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.~rant h~· thP statP, and to accotnplishtnent of the 
}Hll'fH>SPs for 'vhirh thP ~tatP authorized the city 
to ZOnP. rrho~P ]Hll'J10~P~, \Vhieh COntrol and must 
hP !-'Uh~PrvPd h~· any zoning, ar{l set forth in Sec-
tion 15-8-91, lJ. ( ~ ... .\. 19-1-3, quoted supra. The {l le-
tnPnt~ required of a zoning plan are: It u1ust be 
comprehensiv(}; it must he dPsigned to protect 
the health, Hafet~·, and n1orals of the inhabitants; 
to protnote the gen{lral "·plfare; avoid overcrowd-
ing and eongestion in traffic and population ; 
facilitatP transportation and other public ser-
vieP: and 1neet the ordinary or com1non require-
1HPnts of happy convenient and comfortable living 
h~,. the inhabitants of the districts, and the city as 
a 'vhole .... 
* * * 
"The basic purpose of zoning is to 'bring 
about an orderly development of cities, to estab-
lish districts into which business, commerce, and 
industry shall not intrude, and to fix certain terri-
tory for different grades of industrial concerns. 
• • • The exercise [of this power] must have a 
substantial relation to the public good within the 
~pheres held proper.' White's Appeal, 287 p·a. 
~59, 134 A. 409, 412, 53 A.L.R. 1215. 'It is a 
fundamental theory of the zoning scheme that it 
~hall be for the general good, to secure reasonable 
neighborhood uniformity, and to exclude struc-
tures and occupations which clash there,vith.' ... 
* * * 
HZoning is done for the benefit of the city as 
a ",.hole, and the lin1itations imposed on respective 
tli~tricts n1ust be done 'vith a vie'v to the benefit 
of the district as a "'"hole, and not from considera-
tion of particular tracts .... 
* * * 
H ~The tests of validity in such cases are : 
Does the ordinance bear a reasonable relation to 
the public health, 1norals, safety or general wel-
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fare; have the districts been created according 
to a fair and rational plan~'" 
We now turn to a discussion of the 1nerits of plain-
tiffs' argument in light of the principles laid dow·n in tl1P 
Marshall case. 
THE CO,MPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR 
INVALIDITY OF T·HE OR.DINANCE 
As heretofore noted, the coinplaint charges that the 
zoning action is not in accordance "~ith a "con1prehensive 
plan"; not supported by a sho,Ying of changed circunl-
stances; not in furtherance of the police po\ver, and con-
trary to the purpose and spirit of the zoning la\vs. Any 
one of these allegations, if supported by evidence at the 
trial of the cause, \Vould justify the relief sought. 
Comprehensive Plan 
Statutory enabling legislation requires that munici-
pal zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" 
(10-9-3, 11.C.A., 1953). In this respect, the Utah statutes 
are similar to legislation adopted by legislatures of over 
40 other states. The decision in the Marshall case, In 
referring to zoning action, states: 
HThis [zoning by di~trict~] is done under thP 
police po\ver and by the statute Hl'lfst be done in 
accordance 1.rith a co1nprehensiz 1e plan ... 
* * * 
" ... The Pleinents required of a zoning plan 
are : It must be comprehensive; . . . (Emphasis 
added) 
There is son1e confusion in the cases as to the mean-
1ng of the tern1 "comprehensivP plan." AuthoritiPs 
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.~Pn(lrally agrPP that the ter1ns ''Ina~ter plan'' and ~'coin­
pn·hPn~ivP plan'' nre not synonytnous. The former is 
dPfin•·d hy onP authority on thP subject as "a long-ter1n 
.~PnPrnl plan for the ph~·si(lal develop1nent of the com-
rnunity \vhieh en1bodies inforn1ation, judgments and ob-
.i•·etivP~ collected and forn1ulated by experts to serve as 
hoth a guide and predictive force" ( Haar, "In Accord-
nnre 'Vith .A. Comprehensive Plan," infra). Existence of 
a 1nn~tPr plan is not essential to the validity of zoning 
tneasures (SPe, e.g., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 
tTtah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633). 
The ~'comprehensive plan," "·hich is essential to the 
validity of any zoning 1neasure, has been defined as "a 
general plan to control and direct the use and develop-
InPnt of property in a municipality or a large part there-
of hy dividing it into districts according to the present 
and potential uses of the property." Clark v. Town 
Council of Tou·n of West Hartford, 145 ·Conn. -176, 144 
. \.:!d 327. Confusion in the cases as to what the standard 
"cotnprehensive plan'' means is pointed out in an article 
on the subject written by Charles ~f. Haar, Assistant 
Professor of La,v, Harvard Law School: ("In Accord-
ance 'Yith A Co1nprehensive Plan," 68 Harv. L. Rev., 
1154, 1167) 
H .:\n ele1nent apparently co1nmon to all the 
(lases dealing \Yith this problem is consideration 
of \\·hether the zoning action under attack con-
forins to so1ne sort of general plan-that is, 
w·hether it may be defended as logically related 
to ~omething broader than and beyond itself. This 
general plan, or comprehensive plan, 'vith which 
the runendinent must conforn1, is many things to 
Inany courts. It 1nay be the basic zoning ordinance 
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itself, or the generalized 'polir~v' of the locallegi~­
lative or planning authoriti~s in rP~pPet to their 
cit~~'s development-or it 1nay be nothing 1nore 
than a general feeling of fairness and rationalitY. 
Its identity is not fi:rrrl 1rith any precision, aJ;d 
n.o one can point 1rith confidence to rn1y particular 
set of factors, or any docun1e;d, and ,~.,·ay that there 
is tlu~ general plan to u·hich the zoni·nlJ enablinq 
act de;nnnds fidelity." (En1phasis added) 
A requirement common to all of the ca~P~ i~ that 
the zoning ordinance n1ust be con1prehensive in that it 
is n1otivated by '"benefit of the district as a \\Thole and 
not a consideration of particular tracts" and may be 
logically related to something broader than the property 
itself. (SPe ll!arshall r. Salt Lake City~ supra.) 
All of the authorities recognize that a change or 
an1endment of an existing zoning plan n1ust be 1nade in 
conformity to the enabling statute to the san1e extent a~ 
an original zoning ordinance. The "co1nprehen~ive" 
standard is thus applicable to changes and a1nendn1ents 
of the 1nap. In analyzing this standard as it relates to 
rnnendments, the Court should initially deter1nine "1'he-
ther "co1nprehensive plan', is synony1nous ·w·ith the 
zoning map and ordinance or 'vhether it requires con-
sideration of matters extrinsic to the ordinance itself. 
In this regard, the case of Hochberg v. Borough of Free-
hold, 40 N.J.Super. 276, 123 A.2d ~6, is of assistanrP. 
Plaintiffs in the H ochbrrg case sought to set aside an 
amendment to the zoning ordinancP. In applying the 
"co1nprehensive" standard, the court said: (123 A.2d 
4-6, 51) 
HBut \\~hat does the ter1n "con1preh~nsiv<' plan' 
~ignify f It hardly SPPnls to haYP r~ference jn~t to 
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tht· plan PtuhorliPd in thP zoning ordinanrP it~Plf~ 
hP('H\l~P thPn the zoning ~ehPillP \Vould hP frozen 
and hPyond a1nend1nent. ThP zoning la'v looks 
to\vard a stable [citing authorities] but not a 
static or unchangeable community [citing authori-
tiPsl. 
··The tPrin 'rontprPhensive plan' therefore 
~ignifips so1nething other than the prP-Pxisting 
zone plan. ~r oreover, it has significance, even 
though, as in thP case of the Borough of Free-
hold, thPrP is no formal master plan .... 
.. Ho1ne slight clue to the significance of the 
tPrin is perhaps to be found in the following 
explanatory note to Section 3 of the Standard 
~tatP Zoning Enabling Act (rPcon1mended by 
lT. S. Dept. of Com., Hoover, Secy. of Com., 
1926) fro1n "Thich N .. J.S.A. 40:55-32 'vas largely 
taken: 
~Thi~ \Yill prevent haphazard or piece-
Iueal zoning. No zoning should be done ",.ith-
out such a co1nprehensive study.' 
~' _.:\_ co1nprehensive plan, like the process 
kno\vn as municipal planning, should take account 
of the variant interests affecting the physical 
layout of the con11nunity, accon1n1odating them to 
the interest of the connnunity as a social unit 
[citing authorities]. 
"So far as the present case goes, we may say 
then that a comprehensive plan involves at least 
this-a comprehensive outlook on the community 
"·elfare as a \Yhole, both a.t present and in the 
foreseeable future [citing authorities]. Other fac-
tor~ 1nay be covered by the term, which require 
consideration under other circumstances, but they 
need not be dealt 'vith here .... " 
.. \s pointed out in the Hochberg case, if the existing 
ordinance is the ·~coinprehensive plan" referred to in the 
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statute, then any change of thi~ ordinance is ·i p::;o facto 
contrary to and not in accordance \\·ith the plan. Such 
an interpretation would. render the plan beyond amend-
nlent. 
A competent planner cannot rationall~· d( 1tPrinine by 
looking alone to a paper plan that the next a1nend1nrnt 
for the overall good should be eith~r in this dirPc-tion or 
that direction. ~Iany matters extrinsic to thP 1nap Blust 
be considered. The {Ttah Supren1e Court in Gnyland r. 
Salt Lake Co1tnty, 11 1~tah 2d 307, 358 P.~d G33, rPcog-
nized the necessity of considering Inatters extrinsic to 
the map or ordinance in enacting zoning legislation. 
Referring to the duty of the zoning authority~ this Court 
said: (11 lTtah 2d 307, 310, 311) 
Hit has the rP~pon~ibilit~· of advising itself 
of an pertinent fac-ts as a basis for determining 
'vhat is in the public interest in that regard." 
"·hich must includt1 such facts "bearing on the question 
of proper zoning" as : 
'•. . . location of busine~se~, school~, roads and 
traffic conditions, gro,:r-th in population and hous-
ing the capacity of utilities, the existing classifi-
f'aton of surrounding propPrty, and the effect that 
the proposed reclassification 1nay have on these 
things and upon the genPral orderly develop1nent 
of the county." 
This Court further said: 
""In pPrforininp; their dut~· it is both their 
privilege and obligation to take into consideration 
their o'vn kno"'"ledge of such 1natters and also to 
gather available pertinent infor1nation fron1 all 
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possible sourees and give consideration to it in 
making their determination.'' (Emphasis added) 
.Any fair, logical and rational an1endment to an 
Pxi~ting plan must take into account such rnatters extrin-
~ie to the ordinance itself as existing land uses, nature, 
condition and value of existing buildings, traffic condi-
tions, property values, land vacancies, trends in land 
devPlopinent, population changes, public need, estab-
lished policies en1ployed in sin1ilar applications, and 
ntunerous other considerations. None of these factors is 
disclosed by inspection or study of the zoning map. An 
ntnendinent of the ordinance which does not take into 
account these factors extrinsic of the ordinance and map 
certainly cannot fulfill the objective of "community 'vel-
fare as a whole both at present and in the foreseeable 
future'' as required and contemplated by the "compre-
hensive" standard. 
The City Commission 1n this case heard and pre-
sumably considered evidence extrinsic of the ordinance 
and map. Plaintiffs contend that the action of the Com-
tnission in amending the ordinance 'vas not in accordance 
\vith, but contrary to the "comprehensive" standard, and 
8pecifically that the zoning action was based solely upon 
considerations pertinent to the property rezoned and the 
O\\"ners of such property. The trial court in this cause 
has determined as a matter of law, 'vithout benefit of 
Pvidence as to any of the extrinsic factors bearing upon 
proper planning and zoning, that the zoning action was 
reasonable. Plaintiffs contend that this determination is 
clearly erroneous. 
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K,uehue ,z·. To1rn of East Hartford, 136 Conn. 45~, 7~ 
A.2d 47 4, illustrates judicial application of thP Hcoinpre-
hensive '' standard. The facts are sin1ilar to tho~P in-
volved in the case at bar. ThP zoning authorit~~ of thP 
To\vn of East Hartford rezoned property in a residential 
zone for business use. 'The applicant intended to ereet 
facilities for six or eight stores in the nature of retail 
stores and small business establishments calculated to 
serve the needs of residents in the vicinity. A s1nall area 
already zoned for business \vas located relatively close. 
Fifty-one of the residents of the area filed their petition 
in support of the change. An appeal from the zoning 
action was taken to the Connecticut trial court. Exten-
sive evidence was taken and the action of the zoning 
authority \vas affirmed. On appeal the Connecticut Su-
preme Court reversed, holding : ( 72 A.2d 4 7 4, 4 78, 4 79) 
'"A lin1itation upon th<· po\vers of zoning 
authorities ... i~ that the regulation~ they adopt 
n1ust be made 'in accordancP \vith a con1prehen-
• T I ' Sl\ e p an. . .. 
"'In the case beforP us it is obvious that the 
couneil looked no further than the benefit \vhich 
n1ight accrue to Langloi~ and those \Yho resided 
in the vicinity of his property, and that they gavP 
no consideration to the larg<·r question as to the 
effect the change \vould havP upon the general 
plan of zoning in the connnunity. '' 
* * * 
"The action of the to\vn <·ouncil in this ca~e 
\\Ta~ not in furthPrance of any general plan of 
zoning in the connnunity and cannot be ~n~­
tained.'' 
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HPP also .Appley 1'. 1'olrnship Conuu,ittce, 12S X.J.l.J. 195, 
:!4 .\.2d SO:->, and cases eollPetPd at 51 A.L.R.2d :2():3. It 
i~ ~ignificant that the dPtertnination tnade in these cases 
and in the ill a rshalf ca~P \Vas predicated upon evidence 
of ull undPrlying eircutnstances \Vhich is in sharp con-
tra~t to the stun1nary rPviP\V of the map 1nade by the trial 
eourt in this cause. 
Hhould this Court conclude that the ter1n "con1pre-
hl1n~ive plan," \Vhen applied as a test of the validity of a 
zoning atnendtnent, is in fact synony1nous with the exist-
ing zoning ordinance and that the word "comprehensive" 
doP~ not contetnplate consideration of factors other than 
the tnap itself, then plaintiffs earnestly contend that the 
zoning action here was patently inconsistent \vith the 
plan (map). The change is in direct violation of the 
"ba~ie purpose" of zoning as stated in the Marshall case 
in that it arbitrarily creates a business district in the 
heart of a long established residential area. Assuming 
need for additional business properties (which need \vas 
not sho,vn in this case) then logic and reason suggest 
Pnlargement or extension of existing business or con1-
Inerrial areas. From the plan itself it can be seen that 
there is no rational basis for jumping into the center of 
a re~idential area when business districts which could 
have been enlarged or extended are located in the san1e 
general area. Such action is in direct conflict 'vith the 
"reasonable neighborhood uniformity" and "orderly de-
velopment" contemplated by this Court in the JJl arshall 
ease. The boundaries of the ne"r business district are 
like\Yise indefensible. Such boundaries are based solely 
upon the availability of land and not on any rational 
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basis of harn1onious, reasonable and appropriatP land 
use on a general sche1ne. 
It appears that the trial court in this cause Pither 
concluded that a zoning change need not compl~· "·ith thP 
"con1prehensive" standard or he looked at the zoning 
1nap 'vithout benefit of extrinsic evidence and concluded 
as a Inatter of la"r that the City had con1plied "·ith thi~ 
standard. Either conclusion is reversihlP PlTor. 
Police Power- Zoning Purposes 
Cities do not have authority to li1nit or restriet the 
use of private property Pxeept in furtheraneP of the 
police power. The Ma,rshall decision recognizes that zon-
ing is "done under the poliee pow·er" and '~Inust have for 
its purposes and objeetives matters "·hieh rorne \\·ithin 
the province of the poliee power." The statute enumer-
ates those purposes for 'vhich zoning is intended (i.e. to 
lessen congestion in the streets, prevent overero\\·ding of 
land, avoid undue concPntration of population, etc.). 
This Court in the Marshall case concludes that the "basic 
purpose" of zoning is to : 
". . . 'bring about an orderly develop1nent of 
cities, to establish districts into 1rhich b·usiness, 
con1n1r1~re and indu.'·dry shall not intrude, and to 
fix certain territory for different grades of in-
dustrial concerns .... It i~ a funda1nental theory 
of the zoning sche1ne that it shall be for the 
general good, to secure reasonable neighborhood 
uniforn1ity, and to ~xclude structure~ and oceu-
pationf' "·hich clash thPre\\·ith.' ... " (En1phasis 
added) 
'\Tith established business districts in the near vicinity, 
intrusion of a small new business district into the heart 
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of a long-t.'}~tabli~hPd re~idential area is at once ~u~pect 
of ~pPrinl intPreHt legi~lation and lack of planning. 
Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance involved 1n 
thi~ netion was not passed to acco1nplish any of the pur-
po~es enutnerated in thP enabling statute and is not a 
IP~ititnate exPrrise of the police po,vt~r. The complaint 
rharges that the ordinance gives no consideration to the 
purposes and objects of zoning legislation. This allega-
tion is one 'vhich may be tested only by evidence. 
Zoning action based solely upon considerations per-
tinent to one tract of land or one group of individuals 
cannot be •'designed" in furtherance of the public wel-
fare. For example, rezoning of a part of a residen-
tial area so that commercial interests will erect 
ne'v buildings may serve an immediate problem in the 
tract rezoned. But, what happens to the rest of the resi-
dential district surrounding the ne,vly created commer-
cial zone' 
Due consideration to the effect of the zoning action 
here "'"ould have disclosed that the action taken will 
create instability in the surrounding residential zone 
'vhich 'viii deter and possibly prevent redevelopment of 
the debilitated area for residential use. Thus, 'vhile an 
aesthetic and delinquency problem for a few may have 
been aided, a greater slum and delinquency problem is 
created for many. (Evidence in this cause would show, 
among other things, that the general plan of Salt Lake 
City has been to restrict the east line of the general 
business area to 5th East Street except for small neigh-
borhood business areas provided by the original ordi-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
nancl~ of 1927. In son1e instancPs thP boundaries .of tlH' 
outlying business districts have been rPadjusted. The 
ne'v business zone on 7th East Street creates a high dP-
gree of uncertainty as to the probable future classifica-
tion and use of the residential property no"~ located 
hPt\\~ePn the ne'v zone and the con1n1Prcial properties to 
the \\Test.) 
Plaintiffs' evidence \\~ould show· that Salt Lake ( 1 it~· 
alrPady has too n1uch husiness and eorninPreial zoning 
by all standards. Busin('~~ intPrests in land usP arP not 
ah\Tays parallel and consistent 'Yith the publie intPrest 
in proper com1nunity planning, ho"rever. In this ens(• thP 
business interests 'Yhich the defendant Alder-\\T allaeP 
rPprPsents desired a largP tract of land for coHnnPreial 
use at the lowest possible eost. It is obviously n1uch less 
expensive to acquire such a. tract in a residential area 
than it is to obtain propert~T in an area already zoned 
for commercial use. The next step is to ask City author-
ities to rezone the residence property which has been 
optioned so that it can la,vfully be used for cornmercial 
purposes. Such a proposal naturally has the support 
of many property o'vners "Those profitable sale of their 
property is contingent upon t1H 1 rezoning. Like"~ise, 
such a proposal is highly offensive to the conscience 
of the City planning staff. (The report of the Planning 
Con1mission in this case demonstrated intensive study 
o.f the application and careful thinking on its n1erit 
fro1n a planning standpoint.) It is not difficult to estab-
lish a case for the proposition that business zoning 'Yill 
benefit these property o'vners and the Yaluation of the 
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prop~rty thPy SPPk to ~ell. Huch a ~ase is, nPVPrthPIP~~, 
n poor (and in fact an unla,vful) basis for zoning action. 
The zoning a<·tion taken hy the Co1n1nission in this 
<'fl~tl not only fails to consider public \Velfare in tPrins 
of zoning legislation, but is antagonistic \vith public 
good in these areas. The trial court's review of the 
zoning map did not give fair judicial consideration to 
thP problen1s of public welfare 'vhich are presented by 
thP enactment of this ordinance. Evidence would estab-
li~h the plaintiffs' position that the action here was 
not designed to fulfill any public purpose. Plaintiffs 
~hould be permitted to prove that the amendment to the 
1nap ,,·as in this case at the instance of private persons 
and for their benefit and not in the public interest. 
Change of Conditions 
In the case at bar, Salt Lake ·City, after due study 
and public hearing, adopted a co1nprehensive and gen-
eral zoning ordinance in 1927. The subject premises 
and lands surrounding them have been zoned for resi-
dential use since original enactment of the ordinance. 
History of zoning in the municipality will show that 
thPre have been no significant changes in commercial 
zoning except in ter1ns of readjustment of the bound-
aries of existing con1n1ercial districts. The action here 
taken does not fall \vithin the category of readjustment 
of boundaries, for it is not contiguous ''"'ith any existing 
eon1n1ercial district. Instead, it constitutes the creation 
of an entirely new coinmercial district. It is a sub-
stantial departure fro1n the existing 1nap or plan. 
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Prestunably the plan existing at thP tiu1e of the 
amendment, \vhich plan classified the propPrty as resi-
dential, \vas a fair, rational and conlprE?h(Jn~iv<· plan. 
Such a presumption was given recognition by the court 
in Northwest lVlerchants Termina.l Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 
l\f d. 721, 60 A.2d 7 43, \vhere the court said: 
"There is a presumption that zonPs arP "T<'ll 
planned and arranged and are to lH~ n1ore or 
less permanent subJect to change only to meet 
genuine chan,ge in conditions." (Emphasis added) 
In Page v. City of Portl(Jfflrd, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 
280, the Oregon Supre1ne Court, in striking do\vn an 
amendatory ordinance, said: 
"Police power 1nust be exercised to proinotP 
the general \Velfare of the people at large, and 
not for the interests of any private group [citing 
authorities]. Amendments to zoning ordinances 
should be made with caution and only when 
changing conditions clearly require amendment. 
Otherwise, the very purpose of zoning will be 
destroyed.'' (Emphasis added) 
To the same effect is W1~lco1', et al. /c. City of p,£ttsbtttrgh, 
121 F.2d 835 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941), ",.here the trial court 
had dismissed on motion a complaint attacking an 
amendatory ordinance. The dismissal order \vas reversed 
by the circuit court in an opinion \vhich read in part 
as follo\vs: 
''In th<· juristie ~ensP \\"';' think the council 
haYP been fully put upon their proof. The general 
principle is concedPd. ChangP~ in the plan, likP 
tlH· enact1nent of the original ordinancP, arP an 
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tliXPrri~e of polirP po\ver ...... 4s conditions are 
th(' ha.,·is a ud j u sf if ica fin u for .zoning, clearly a 
change in the {orn1er is essential to a chau,qe in 
the latter." (Emphasis added) 
ThP general rule rPquiring ~'change of conditions" as a 
ba8is for atnendtnent of a zoning ordinance is stated in 
101 C.J.S. 837 and the cases are eollected in footnotes 
in the ~ntne voluniP and in the pocket parts. 
The plaintiff ha.s alleged and proposes to prove tha.t 
thPrP has been no change of conditions or change of 
eirctunstances since the enactment of the original ordi-
nance which warrants or justifies the amendment to the 
plan. The trial court has brushed aside this allegation 
hy hi~ su1n1nary dismissal order. We do not believe that 
opposing rounsel can find any legal basis for the action 
of the trial judge in this regard. 
THE RECORD DOES NO'T JU8TIFY A DETERMINATION 
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 
ARE NOT TRUE 
The allegations of the plaintiffs' con1plaint and the 
denials of the defendants' answers set the case at issue. 
The affidavit of Vernon Jorgensen does not relate in 
any ,,·ay to the factual background or merits of the zon-
ing action (R. 21). The affidavit of Oscar W. ~IcConkie, 
Jr. is a 1nemorandum "~hich simply sets forth the de-
fendants' summary of plaintiffs' allegations; states that 
said allegations give rise to la'v questions only, and 
further states that ~'the l"Ttah Supreme Court has settled 
the la\v in these questioned particulars" ( R. 17-19). 
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rrhere is no factual 1nattPr in 1\Ir. 1\IcConkie'~ affidavit 
\Vhich 'vould permit the trial court to eonc.lude as a 
mattPr of la\Y that the plaintiffs' allPgation~ ar(• not 
true. Likewise, there is nothing in thP state1nent of 
plaintiff's counsel made at the time of pretrial which 
"""ould \\~arrant such a conclusion (R. 28-39). 
In our revie\\~ of tlu} cases \Ye have found no state 
or federal decision 'vhich disposes of issue~ such as an~ 
raised here \Yi thout the taking of evidence. Cases tried 
in this and other jurisdictions have been d(~eided onl~? 
after introduction of vvidence pertaining to the factual 
background and basis of the zoning action. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the co1nplaint 
and prPtrial state1nent state a claim upon \\·hich reli(·f 
can b(~ granted and that there is no basis in the record 
for a determination as a 1natter of la\Y that the allega-
tions are not true. For this reason it is earne~tly eon-
tended that the cause should be reversed and re1nanded 
for trial. 
Re~1)( ·ctfully ~~n h1nitted, 
\-.._.AX COT1\ B .. \GLE"\"'"~ CORX\'T ALL 
& ~fcCARTHY 
Grant ~facfarlan .. , Jr. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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